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NOTES
Attaching Creditor's Right To Assert Debtors Defense
Of Usury In Action By Usurious Party
The buyer of a house trailer gave a chattel mortgage as part
of the purchase price and received title. The sheriff attached
the trailer pursuant to an order of attachment obtained by two
creditors of the buyer. The holder of the chattel mortgage, who
was the original seller, brought an action to replevin the trailer.
The defense of usury was raised. Held for plaintiff. An attach-
ing creditor does not stand in privity with the debtor and there-
fore cannot raise the debtor's defense of usury.'
The general rule is that the plea of usury as a defense is
personal to the borrower and those in legal privity with him.2
But privity here seems to have an unusual connotation.
The courts have split in determining whether a judgment
creditor3 or an attachment creditor 4 can raise the defense.
1 Commonwealth Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Bradt, 166 Neb. 1, 87 N.W.2d
705 (1958).
2 Cheney v. Dunlap, 27 Neb. 401, 43 N.W. 178 (1889); cf annotation 5
L.R.A. 465; 55 Am.Jur. Usury § 121, note 7 for extensive listing of
cases in other jurisdictions.
3 Cases allowing the defense: Roesch v. DeMota, 24 Cal.2d 563, 150
P.2d 422 (1944); 1915 C L.R.A. 643. Contra: Mason v. Pierce, 142 Ill.
331, 31 N.E. 503 (1892); 1915 C L.R.A. 645.
4 Cases allowing the defense: American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo.
App. 656 (1893); 1915 C L.R.A. 643. Contra: Fenby v. Hunt, 53 Wash.
127, 101 P. 492 (1909); 1915 C L.R.A. 645. The development of the
rule favoring allowing an attachment creditor to raise the defense
is as follows: The leading case in the field as to the rights of attach-
ing creditors is Dix v. Van Wyck, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 522 (1842) in which
the court held than an execution creditor, who had attached chattels
covered by a prior chattel mortgage, could raise the defense of usury
in a replevin action by the mortgagee since he had an interest in the
property. This case was picked up in Stein v. Swensen, 44 Minn.
218, 46 N.W. 360 (1890) where the Minnesota court applied the rule
of execution creditors to attachment creditors in an action analagous
to Dix v. Van Wyck, supra, except for the defendants being attach-
ment creditors. The court made this application on the grounds that
there was no fundamental reason for distinguishing between an ex-
ecution creditor and an attachment creditor. Both this case and the
position of the New York court was next picked up in American
Rubber Co. v. Wilson, supra, where an attachment creditor raised the
defense of usury against the holder of a prior chattel mortgage when
the mortgagee attempted to replevin the chattel from the sheriff. The
court after reviewing the foregoing cases, and the cases supporting the
stand taken therein, held that the defense of usury could be raised
since the attachment creditor had an interest in the property.
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The courts have generally held that this defense cannot be
raised by a general creditor 5 since he does not have an interest
in the property.6 This is not applicable to an attachment cred-
itor since he has a lien on the property and thus an interest.7
A grantee who assumes8 or takes subject to 9 a prior usurious
lien, and reduces the purchase price by the amount of the mort-
5 Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S.W. 209 (1896); 1915 C
L.R.A. 642. Contra holdings to this are more in the form of an ex-
ception of where the debtor is insolvent. The only state having much
of a history recognizing this as' an exception is Kentucky. The cases
serving to start this trend of holdings in Kentucky were Shanks v.
Stephens, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 526, and Hart v. Hayden, 79 Ky. 346 (1881).
Care should be taken in examination of the usury statute and whether
it only declares the excess void. In Cole v. Bansemer, 26 Ind. 94 (1866)
the court allowed action on the grounds that the danger of forfeiture
was not present under such a statute.
6 American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656 (1893).
7 American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656, 661 (1893). The
court held: "He is not merely a general creditor of the mortgagor,
but he has so far connected himself with him as to have laid hold
of his property with the process of the court issued at his instance
and he is entitled to have out of it all of the interest which the mort-
gagor may have had in it at the time of the levy of the writ . . .";
Note that in Keene v. Sallenbach, 15 Neb. 200, 18 N.W. 75 (1883) the
court held that an attachment creditor acquired a lien upon the in-
terest of the debtor which may be enforced after he acquires judg-
ment. The case was affirmed in National Bank of Columbus v. Hol-
lerin, 31 Neb. 558, 48 N.W. 392 (1891).
S Cheney v. Dunlap, 27 Neb. 401, 43 N.W. 178 (1889); McKnight v. Phelps,
37 Neb. 858, 56 N.W. 308 (1893); Building & L. Asso. v. Bilan, 59 Neb.
458, 81 N.W. 308 (1899); 21 A.L.R. 495; 82 A.L.R. 1153. The defense
has been allowed when clear intent to contrary has been shown. Na-
tional Mutual Building & Loan Assn. v. Retzman, 69 Neb. 667, 96 N.W.
204 (1903); Lankford v. Holton, 187 Ga. 94, 200 S.E. 243 (1938); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Davis (Tex.Civ.App.), 163 S.W.2d 433
(1942).
' Central Holding Co. v. Bushman, 238 Mich. 261, 213 N.W. 120 (1927)
on grounds that equivalent to an appropriation by the vendor of a
portion of the purchase money for the payment of the usurious debt;
Howard v. Kirkpatrick, 263 App.Div. 776, 31 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1941) on
grounds that a conveyance subject to a usurious morgtage constituted
a waiver of the defense of usury by the debtor. Contra: Chandler
v. Cooke, 163 Miss. 147, 137 So. 496 (1931) is contra by words of court
but grantee had a partial interest in the subject land at time of the
mortgage; Lloyd v. Scoot, Dist. Co., 29 U.S. 205 (1830) is example of
contra case due to wording of statute being void. If the purchase
price has not been reduced to the amount of the usurious mortgage
the grantee may be allowed to raise defense. National Mutual Build-
ing & Loan Assn. v. Retzman, 69 Neb. 667, 96 N.W. 204 (1903); Watt
v. Cecil, 368 Ill. 510, 15 N.E.2d 292 (1938).
NOTES
gage, is generally refused the right to raise the debtor's defense
of usury, since he has consented to the usury, and, if the defense
is allowed, he will obtain a windfall. 10 It has been held that the
grantee can raise the defense, although the mortgage has been
assumed, where it is clearly indicated that payment of the usur-
ious interest is not intended and the purchase price has only been
reduced to take into consideration a legal rate of interest since
there is then no element of consent or windfall.11
Although there is an apparent lack of uniformity on the treat-
ment of junior lien holders 12 most, if not all, of the cases may
be reconciled by determining whether he has consented to the
prior usurious mortgage.13 If consent is found the defense is
rightfully denied since the junior lien holder has a choice whether
or not to take such a lien, and second, allowing the defense un-
der such circumstances would result in a windfall.'
4
The above objections do not apply to an attachment creditor,
under the facts of the principal case, since the lien holders had
no choice of property to levy upon, and there is no question of
windfall since the attachment creditors will only be allowed to
satisfy their legal claims.
The Nebraska statute in point'5 declares such a contract as
here involved to be void. Accepting the court's opinion that
void means voidable, which position finds high support,1 still
the change of terminology would seem to indicate at least some
intent to expand the effect of the statute.' 7
10 See National Mutual Building & Loan Assn. v. Retzman, 69 Neb. 667,
96 N.W. 204 (1903).
11 Supra, note 10.
12 See 1915 C L.R.A. 645; 59 A.L.R. 342; 121 A.L.R. 879 for exhaustive
collection of cases on this question.
13 Levitch v. Schaengold, 42 Ohio St. 44, 181 N.E. 821 (1931); First Na-
tional Bank v. Niklosson, 116 Neb. 713, 218 N.W. 744 (1928).
14 Supra, note 13.
15 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-138 (Supp. 1957). . . . Any contract of loan made
in violation of this section, either knowingly or without the exercise
of due care to prevent the same, shall be void and the licensee shall
have no right to collect or receive any principal, interest, or charges
on such loan."
16 See 17 Iowa L.R. 402 (1931) for discussion of the use of the term void,
and listing of cases where the term has been construed in usury statutes.
17 Ludington v. Harris, 21 Wis. 239 (1867) where the question of whether
a grantee by quitclaim could raise the defense of usury was considered.
The court held: "Where the contract is declared void by the statute,
there is good ground for saying that anyone whose property is af-
fected by it may take advantage of the fact."

